Al analizar las misiones CSAR podríamos llegar a la conclusión que se trata de un tipo de actividad impropia de las unidades de Operaciones Especiales, actividad que en otros Ejércitos llevarían a cabo fuerzas convencionales, como los para-rescue en USA. Sin embargo esta conclusión resultaría precipitada.

Debe tenerse en cuenta que en el ámbito doctrinal existen una seria de misiones CSAR que se llevan a cabo en ambientes donde la amenaza es baja o media. En este entorno las unidades convencionales pueden llevar a cabo operaciones CSAR sin problemas. Sin embargo, cuando el nivel de amenaza es alto (high threat), o bien las operaciones CSAR se deben llevar a cabo con una gran cantidad de fuerzas de apoyo, que pueden no estar disponibles, o bien se llevan a cabo con unidades de operaciones especiales (SOF), con capacidad para alcanzar una superioridad de fuerzas relativa en operaciones rápidas. Las siguientes líneas, extractadas de la tesis doctoral de Ecklund y McNerney (2004), llegan precisamente a esta conclusión: que una vez analizadas las capacidades de recuperación convencionales, las capacidades de recuperación del personal de las Fuerzas Especiales pueden ser mucho más apropiadas para el éxito de la misión de CSAR cuando no hay superioridad aérea, las prioridad para recuperar al personal aislado (IP) es suficientemente alta para merecer el uso de FFEE, o el acceso al área está más allá de las capacidades de las fuerzas CSAR convencionales. Es en este entorno en el que se enmarcan las operaciones CSAR que la EZAPAC como fuerza de operaciones especiales del Ejército del Aire lleva a cabo.

The authors argue that special operations forces (SOF) are ideally suited to increase the probability of success of these operations in the high-threat arena of the urban environment. Currently, the individual services have PR capabilities that are doctrinally limited to low or medium-threat environments. However, even in the medium-threat environment, the services require large numbers of supporting forces to conduct those operations. SOF, using relatively small forces to attain relative superiority (RS Recovery Forces) for quick operations, offer the greatest probability for mission success in high-threat environments, especially in urban areas.

DA (direct action) missions conducted by SOF have widely been considered nothing more than hyper-conventional operations—where it is the unit, and not the mission, that is special because of the unique equipment and high proficiency. Even conducting “essentially ordinary conventional warfare activities” SOF offers a higher probability of success in the conduct of PR missions (Adams, 1998, p. 304).

DA operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF or [special operations]-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. One of the activities that fall within the DA mission area is SOF recovery operations.

NAR (nonconventional assisted recovery) operations are performed by special operations forces or other government agencies [OGAs] that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to recover isolated personnel using uniquely developed recovery mechanisms.

By doctrine, “NAR operations may be covert or clandestine” (FM 3-05.231, 2003, p. 1-16). In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities

SOF posses unique equipment, procedural expertise, and organic capability for JPR, but doctrinally perform combat search and rescue (CSAR) in support of SOF missions only. SOF claims to perform CSAR in support of other components on a case-by-case basis, not to interfere with the readiness or operations of core SOF missions, but recent history shows that this is not necessarily the case. As of May 2003, however, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) no longer considers PR to be a collateral special operations activity.

After analyzing conventional recovery capabilities, overt SOF PR capabilities may be more appropriate in situations where air superiority is denied, the priority for recovery of IP is sufficiently high to warrant a special operation, or access is beyond the capability of traditional component CSAR platforms.

Citado de PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS: MODELING SUCCESSFUL OVERT AND CLANDESTINE METHODS OF RECOVERY. Marshall V. Ecklund and Michael A. McNerney. June 2004. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA.